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Abstract—Modern Internet-enabled smart lights promise en-
ergy efficiency and many additional capabilities over traditional
lamps. However, these connected lights create a new attack
surface, which can be maliciously used to violate users’ privacy
and security. In this paper, we design and evaluate novel attacks
that take advantage of light emitted by modern smart bulbs in
order to infer users’ private data and preferences. The first two
attacks are designed to infer users’ audio and video playback
by a systematic observation and analysis of the multimedia-
visualization functionality of smart light bulbs. The third attack
utilizes the infrared capabilities of such smart light bulbs to create
a covert-channel, which can be used as a gateway to exfiltrate
user’s private data out of their secured home or office network.
A comprehensive evaluation of these attacks in various real-life
settings confirms their feasibility and affirms the need for new
privacy protection mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart lighting products, marketed as energy-efficient re-
placements of traditional incandescent and fluorescent lamps
with several novel functionalities enabled by their Internet
connectivity, have soared in popularity in recent years [7],
[9] A common feature among most smart lights is the ability
to remotely control the lights, over a Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or
Zigbee network. Many of the current generation smart lights
are also LED-based, which enables fine-grained customization
of color and intensity of the light being emitted from these
bulbs. Few advanced smart lights are also equipped with
infrared capabilities, intended to aid surveillance cameras in
low visibility environments.
Lighting products have traditionally not been an attractive
target of security/privacy-related threats because conventional
lamps typically do not have access to sensitive user informa-
tion. However, as modern smart lights are usually connected
to users’ home or office network (either directly or via a
communication hub) and can be controlled using users’ mobile
devices, they are poised to become a much more attractive
target for security/privacy attacks than before. In this paper,
we investigate how modern smart lights can be exploited to
infer users’ private information.
In this direction, we first focus on exploiting (details in
Sections IV and VI) a new feature of modern smart lights,
known as multimedia-visualization. Multimedia-visualization
is intended for use in conjunction with a song or video playing
on a nearby media player, which results in a vibrant lighting
effect that is synchronized with the tones present in the audio
or the dominant colors in the video stream, respectively. While
such immersive audio-visual or ambient lighting effects can
be entertaining and relaxing, we speculate that it can also
lead to loss of privacy if not properly safeguarded. Consider a
scenario where an curious adversary can observe the changing
light intensities/colors of a multimedia-visualizing smart light
installed inside a user’s residence (likely through a window).
Can the adversary determine what song/video the user is
playing, only by analyzing the changing light intensities/colors
of the smart light? If yes, then these attacks can have signif-
icant privacy implications for smart light users. For instance,
the US Video Privacy Protection Act (1988) was enacted
to prevent abuse of users’ media consumption information,
which can potentially reveal fine-grained personal interests and
preferences. Our first goal in this paper is to comprehensively
evaluate the feasibility of such attacks that passively employ
outputs from smart lights to infer users’ personal media (both,
audio and video) consumption.
Next, we comprehensively study and evaluate the feasibility
(details in Section VIII) of exploiting a smart light’s infrared
lighting functionality to invisibly exfiltrate a user’s private
data out of his/her secured personal device or network. We
show that such an attack can be accomplished by carefully
manipulating and controlling (possible on modern smart lights)
the infrared light to create a “covert-channel” between the
smart light and an adversary with infrared sensing capability.
With the help of a malicious agent on the user’s smartphone
or computer, the adversary can encode private information
residing on these devices and then later transmit it over the in-
frared covert-channel residing on the smart light. Moreover, as
several popular brands of smart lights do not require any form
of authorization for controlling lights (infrared or otherwise)
on the local network, any application installed on the target
user’s smartphone or computer can safely act as the malicious
data exfiltration agent. The overarching goal of this paper is
to highlight the vulnerable state of personal information of
smart light users, outline system design parameters that lead to
these vulnerabilities and discuss potential protection strategies
against such threats.
II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
LIFX [4] and Phillips Hue [6] are two of the most popular
commercially-available smart light systems. These smart light-
ing systems support millions of colors and multiple shades
of white, have fine-grained brightness and saturation controls,
possess wireless communication capabilities and can be con-
trolled (wirelessly) using software platforms and mobile apps
developed by the manufacturers. Several novel applications
have been developed for such smart lighting systems by
leveraging on their unique wireless communication and fine-
grained control capabilities. For instance, both LIFX and
Phillips Hue bulbs support multimedia-visualization by means
of the manufacturer-provided mobile app or via third-party
apps such as Light DJ [5], lifxDynamic/hueDynamic [3], etc.
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Fig. 1: The LIFX protocol, where a mobile application can
control the bulb using specially formatted packets.
The multimedia-visualization feature of the smart lighting
system, which can be turned on using the system’s mobile
app, is used to change or modulate the brightness and/or color
of user-selected bulb(s) of the system in real-time. During
audio-visualization, the change in brightness is made to reflect
either the surrounding sound levels captured using an on-
device microphone (more ambient noise), or the direct output
of an audio playing application (less or no ambient noise).
During video-visualization, the change in color and brightness
is made to reflect the dominant color and brightness level in
the current frame of the video being played. The mobile app
remotely controls the bulb by periodically sending it specially
formatted packets. A careful analysis of the local network
traffic shows that audio-visualizing applications transmit ap-
proximately 10 packets to the bulb per second, whereas video-
visualizing applications transmit approximately 1 packet per
second. Communication in case of the LIFX bulbs happens
via an 802.11 access point, whereas the Phillips Hue bulb
employs 802.15.4 (Zigbee) protocol to communicate with the
mobile app. Each packet in the LIFX protocol [1] consists of
three headers followed by a payload:
• The headers – frame header, frame address and protocol
header – includes details on how to process the frame and
its payload, and also specifies the destination bulb.
• The payload describes the desired hue, brightness and
saturation levels.
The Phillips Hue platform has a very similar communication
protocol, but employs an additional hub between the 802.11
access point and the bulb. The hub translates TCP/IP packets
in to Zigbee Light Link [10] packets comprehensible to the
Hue bulbs. Upon receiving a packet, the target bulb parses the
packet and changes its color, brightness and saturation based
on the payload information. When multimedia-visualization
(audio or video) is enabled, a stream of packets from the
controlling mobile application creates a real-time visual effect
with the output light.
Color models. Next, we briefly discuss the physical properties
of light emitted from multi-color LED bulbs. These properties
are utilized in the attacks presented later in the paper. Most
colors observed on multi-color LED bulbs (such as the LIFX
and Phillips Hue), are not the same as the electromagnetic
VIBGYOR spectrum. Each color in the VIBGYOR spectrum
has a unique wavelength, whereas the colors ‘seen’ on most
multi-color LED bulbs are made of three additive primary
colors. Almost all visible colors can be constructed for the
human eye by the additive color mixing of three colors that
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Fig. 2: (a) – The HSB cone; (b) – RGB composition of HSB
colors, at full saturation.
are in widely spaced regions of the visible spectrum. If the
three colors of light can be mixed to produce white, they are
called primary colors and the de facto additive primary colors
are Red, Green and Blue (RGB). It is important to note that
three-primary-color models (such as RGB) work only to ‘trick’
the human eye, which perceives color using three types of cone
cells (S, M, and L) [29]. To illustrate with an example, the
violet color seen on a multi-color LED bulb is a combination
of red (λ = 620-750 nm), green (λ = 495-570 nm) and blue
(λ = 450-495 nm) lights in 〈1 : 0 : 2〉 ratio, whereas violet
light in a natural rainbow has a wavelength λ = 380-450 nm.
RGB〈1 : 0 : 2〉 happens to excite the S, M, and L cone cells in
the same way a 380-450 nm wavelength light does. Therefore,
we humans perceive RGB〈1 : 0 : 2〉 as violet. Moreover. the
RGB model enables the production of several other perceptual
colors, such as the color magenta or RGB〈1 : 0 : 1〉, which
does not have its own place in the electromagnetic spectrum. A
RGB color 〈r, g, b〉, where r, g, b ∈ [0, 1], also self-defines the
lightness (or darkness) of the color. In relation to multi-color
LED bulbs, at RGB〈1, 1, 0〉 the bulb outputs yellow light at
maximum brightness, whereas at RGB〈0.1, 0.1, 0〉 the bulb
outputs yellow light at roughly 10% of maximum brightness.
An alternate representation of RGB colors is commonly
done using the HSB (hue, saturation and brightness) model
(Figure 2a). The hue represents all colors (achievable by mix-
ing RGB) in 360 degrees, with 0°, 120° and 240° being Red,
Green and Blue, respectively. At full saturation of compound
colors, only two of the three primary colors are mixed (Figure
2b), which is represented by the outer surface of the HSB
cone. Adding the third primary color reduces saturation and
the saturation level moves closer to the center of the HSB cone.
When all three primary colors are mixed in equal proportion, it
results in white (or zero saturation). In HSB model, brightness
is defined as the intensity of the dominant primary color(s).
However, the perceived brightness (or relative luminance) de-
pends on several biological properties of the eye and physical
properties of electromagnetic radiation [21], [30].
In summary, RGB can be translated to HSB using Equation
31, as follows:
H = cos−1
( 1
2
((r − g) + (r − b))
(r − g)2 + (r − b)(g − b)
) 1
2
;
S = 1 − 3
(r + g + b)
min(r, g, b);
B = max(r, g, b);
r, g, b ∈ [0, 1].
(1)
Infrared lighting. In addition to RGB colors, some smart
lights are also equipped with infrared capabilities. For ex-
ample, the LIFX+ series of bulbs support 950 nm infrared
lighting, which is invisible to the human eye, but useful
for security cameras without built-in night-vision lighting.
The brightness of the infrared light on LIFX+ bulbs can be
controlled using packets with a payload describing the power
level. A power level of zero indicates that the infrared LEDs
will not be used, while a power level of 65535 indicates that
the infrared channel should be set to the maximum possible
value.
III. ADVERSARY MODEL
For the private information inference threats that take advan-
tage of the audio-visualizing and video-visualizing function-
alities of smart lights, we assume a passive adversary whose
goal is to infer a target user’s media consumption by visually
eavesdropping on the smart bulb’s output (i.e., light emitted
by bulb), without actively attacking the user’s wireless (Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, or Zigbee) network or appliances. The user’s
wireless network is assumed to be secured against eaves-
dropping attacks, for example using WPA2, so the adversary
cannot perform direct analysis of the packets sent to the smart
bulb (from the controlling mobile application). In addition
to visual eavesdropping instruments, such as light and color
sensors, the adversary also needs sufficient computational and
storage resources to initially create a comprehensive reference
library of media items (songs and videos), and then match
eavesdropped light patterns to items in the reference library.
For the data exfiltration threat using infrared-enabled smart
lights, we assume an adversary whose goal is to exfiltrate data
out of a target user’s network or personal device, which is
again assumed to be secured against wireless eavesdropping at-
tacks. For the data exfiltration attack to work, the adversary has
to additionally install a malicious software agent on the target
user’s device, for example, their smartphone or computer, that
connects to the same network as their infrared-capable smart
bulbs. This can be achieved by social engineering attacks [22],
or by tricking the user in to installing a Trojan application [16].
The malicious software agent is responsible for encoding target
user’s private data (accessible on-device or on the network) in
a format suitable for infrared communication, and transmits
the encoded data using the user’s infrared-enabled smart light.
We also assume that the malicious software agent cannot
directly communicate with an adversarial server over Internet
(for example, due to a firewall), or that the user’s network
is air-gapped. In addition to infrared sensing hardware, for
successfully executing this attack the adversary also needs
sufficient computational and storage resources to record time-
series of infrared light and process them to reconstruct the
intended private data. In this paper, we explain and evaluate
the feasibility of the above threats by means of a representative
smart lighting system, namely, the LIFX system. We also
assess the generalizability of our results by evaluating the
proposed threats on an alternate system such as Phillips Hue.
IV. AUDIO INFERENCE THREAT
We first outline the working of audio-visualizing smart
lights, followed by the proposed inference attack on audio-
visualizing lights. In the audio-visualization mode, the smart
bulb reacts to the high and low tones present in the input audio
stream by fluctuating its output light brightness. Smart light
mobile applications typically offer two different light coloring
modes during audio-visualization. In static hue mode, the bulb
hue does not change unless manually changed, while in the
random hue mode the bulb periodically changes to a random
hue at full saturation. In both modes, the input audio stream
affects only the brightness level of the bulb, and the bulb hue
(static or random) has no correlation to the audio.
A. Effect of Sound on Bulb Brightness
A simple observation with naked eyes and ears already gave
us the intuition that a smart bulb’s brightness fluctuates more
with higher audio amplitudes. To precisely study this audio-
visualization property of smart light bulbs, we conducted a
systematic analysis of several raw audio tracks by precisely
measuring the corresponding fluctuations in a LIFX bulb’s
brightness levels. For this we created an exploratory setup
(details in Appendix B), where we played a few sample
audio tracks multiple times in static hue mode, and observed
the corresponding time-series of the bulb’s brightness profile
measured using a luminance meter. Our observations from
this exploratory setup resulted in two significant conclusions,
both of which are instrumental in the design of our attack
framework. First, the observed luminance (δl) of the bulb
fluctuates when a relatively high amplitude is detected in the
audio stream. These high amplitudes may represent various
types of tones, such as high vocals or drum beats, which varies
on the type of song being played. The luminance fluctuation
subsides when the audio amplitude is low. This phenomenon
is shown with an example in Figure 3. It is evident from
this example that there exists a clear correlation between the
audio waveform of the song (say A1) and its corresponding
“luminance-profile” (say LA1 ). In other words, a luminance-
profile is the time-series of brightness values of a audio-
visualizing bulb when the song is playing.
Our second observation is that for a given song, the
luminance-profile suffers minor distortions across multiple
recordings. In other words, if the luminance-profile of a song
A1 captured during two different playbacks is denoted by
L′A1 and L
′′
A1
, respectively, then L′A1 and L
′′
A1
will be similar
but not identical. These minor distortions can be attributed
to factors such as varying network latencies, packet loss due
to network congestion and ambient audio noise. Also, because
the brightness level is updated only every 100 milliseconds (10
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Fig. 3: (a) Audio waveform of Beethoven’s 5th Symphony (duration of 7 minutes and 4 seconds); (b) Fluctuations in brightness
of an audio-visualizing smart bulb output (in static hue mode), as captured by a BH1751FVI luminance meter.
Hz), an imperfect alignment of the song’s starting point within
the 100 milliseconds interval can cause a slightly different
luminance-profile that follows. That being said, the similarity
between L′A1 and L
′′
A1
is generally very good. We utilize this
property to design our audio inference framework which is
based on elastic time-series matching (Section IV-B) and is
immune to such minor distortions.
Let us further clarify the notion of ‘brightness’ in these
luminance-profiles captured by the luminance sensor. The total
amount of visible light coming out from a source (the bulb in
our case) is described using the term luminous flux, which is
the luminous energy released per unit time by the source and is
measured in SI units of lumen or lm. Illuminance, on the other
hand, is the amount of luminous flux incident on a surface,
and is measured in lux or lx (lx = lm/m2). The (normalized)
brightness values present in the luminance-profile time series
that we construct (Figure 3b) are nothing but the amount
of luminous energy incident on the BH1751FVI photodiode
(luminance meter used in our setup) divided by surface area
of the sensor. In other words, the brightness values in the
luminance-profile time-series are nothing but the illuminance
values captured by the photodiode or luminance sensor. It
can be difficult to accurately measure illuminance using a
photodiode that is also sensitive to infrared and/or ultraviolet
radiations. However, as the BH1751FVI’s spectral sensitivity
is very close to the human eye (Figure 4a), the sensitivity
of the photodiode to infrared and ultraviolet radiations is not
significant.
B. Factors Affecting Song Identification
Next, let’s discuss how we can use a luminance-profile in
static and random hue modes to uniquely identify songs. In
static hue mode the relative change in bulb’s illuminance will
cause proportional gain or drop on the luminance meter. This
is true for all hues, including compound hues such as yellow
or cyan, because the spectral sensitivity remains constant when
the hue is not changing. As a result, the normalized luminance-
profile of a song will be similar across different colors, as
long as the hue is not changed between the start and end of a
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Fig. 4: (a) Luminance meter’s response to the electromagnetic
spectrum; (b) Luminance meter’s response to different LIFX
bulb hues (using RGB-HSB color model) at fixed brightness
and full saturation.
song playback. This allows us to create a reference library of
luminance-profiles of songs using a single hue, and use it to
match songs across any hue.
Matching luminance-profiles in random hue mode is, how-
ever, more complex. The luminance-profile in random hue
mode is affected by two factors: the brightness (which is de-
pendent on the song’s amplitudes), and the luminance meter’s
sensitivity towards the hues that appear during the playback
(which is independent of the song). From Figure 4a we already
know that the luminance meter’s sensitivity varies for different
hues, which can create unwanted fluctuations in the luminance
meter’s response while recording the luminance-profile of a
song (Figure 4b). This may result in incorrect song matching
and poor inference performance. Moreover, characterizing the
sensitivity of the BH1751FVI photodiode for each hue is
not helpful because the RGB color spectrum does not have
the same physical properties as the VIBGYOR spectrum (as
explained in Section II). Also, certain perceptual colors do not
appear on the VIBGYOR spectrum.
A solution to this problem can be achieved by using a RGB
sensor in conjunction with the luminance meter. A RGB sensor
can help breakdown the composition of random hues coming
out of the smart bulb, which can be used to uniquely identify
the hues. Subsequently, the highest observed luminance level
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Fig. 5: Relative response of 〈r, g, b〉 components for the entire
HSB hue cycle, at full brightness and saturation.
of each hue can be used to normalize the luminance values
of all instances of corresponding hues, that appear during
a song. Once normalized per hue, the resultant time-series
becomes independent of changes in luminance due to changing
hues, and only depends on the song amplitudes. This hue-
independent luminance-profile should be similar across two
different recordings, even when the order of hues is completely
different. To test the feasibility of this approach, we conducted
additional exploratory experiments using a Vernier GDX-LC
RGB sensor. We cycled the bulb through the entire HSB
hue palette at full brightness and saturation, and recorded the
responses observed on the RGB sensor. Figure 5 shows that
the observed response of Red (δr), Green (δg) and Blue (δb)
components have different characteristics. δb has the highest
peak response, followed by δr and δg . Relative luminance
calibrations made by LED bulb manufacturers (so that at fixed
brightness, red, green and blue lights are perceived by the
human eye to be of the same level) play a significant factor
in the differing peak response. As seen in Figure 4a, our eyes
are more sensitive to green than red and blue. As a result, red
and blue colors are calibrated to be more luminous than green,
so as avoid a greenish-white perception for RGB〈1 : 1 : 1〉.
We also observed that the color composition does not follow
the ideal HSB model (Figure 2b), with some hues missing a
primary color and some hues where all three primary colors
are present (which should not happen at full saturation). This
observation can be attributed to imperfect RGB sensing by
the sensor [2], and/or possible design limitations of the RGB
LEDs present in the bulb. These observations were consistent
with another bulb of same make and model, which reduces the
possibility of having manufacturing defects in our particular
bulb.
While the above observations are not ideal, we can still
approximately identify individual hues based on their observed
RGB response ratios 〈δr : δg : δb〉. Certain hues neighboring
to 0° and 240° cannot be uniquely identified because of only
one primary color being present. However, that does not affect
the proposed approach of normalization based on highest lu-
minance of the identified hue, because hues neighboring to 0°
and 240° are physically still red and blue lights, respectively.
Moreover, the response of the only primary color remains
roughly the same for these neighboring hues (Figure 5), at
fixed brightness. In order to consistently identify a light hue at
different brightness levels based on its RGB composition, the
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Fig. 6: (a) Observed response of 〈r, g, b〉 components
〈δr, δg, δb〉 for RGB〈1 : 1 : 1〉, and (b) Response factors
for RGB〈1 : 1 : 1〉 at different brightness levels.
response ratio 〈δr : δg : δb〉 should also remain constant across
varying brightness levels. To test if this holds true, we analyzed
RGB〈1 : 1 : 1〉 at different brightness levels and recorded the
corresponding δr, δg and δb values observed on the GDX-
LC sensor. Figure 6a shows the increasing 〈δr, δg and δb〉
values as the brightness was increased, and Figure 6b shows
the response factors. As the response factors
(
δr
(δr+δg+δb)
,
δg
(δr+δg+δb)
and δb(δr+δg+δb)
)
remain fairly constant across the
entire brightness range, we can in fact use 〈δr : δg : δb〉 to
uniquely identify light hues at any brightness level.
The next challenge in normalizing a random hue luminance-
profile is to ensure that we observe all hues at their highest
luminance points at least once, based on which all occurrences
of the corresponding hues will be normalized. The highest lu-
minance point is generally observed at the peaks in fluctuations
that occur when a high amplitude is detected in the input audio.
The number of peaks per minute varies significantly between
different types of music. With a conservative assumption
of 20 peaks per minutes, it will take a minimum of 18
minutes to learn the highest luminance values of 360 hues (one
per degree). However, because the hue changes randomly in
random hue mode, the probability that a specific hue appears
on a peak is 1360 and the probability that a hue appears
within first k peaks can be represented as the cumulative
probability of a geometric distribution: 1 − (1 − 1360 )k. The
probability that all 360 hues appear at least once within first
k peaks can be modeled as a classical occupancy problem
in probability theory [17]. Figure 8a shows the cumulative
probability distribution of a particular hue appearing within
first k peaks and Figure 8b shows the cumulative probability
distribution of all 360 hues appearing within first k peaks.
A particular hue will appear with a probability greater than
99.999% at k ≥ 5000, whereas the probability of all 360 hues
appearing at least once in the first 5000 peaks is 99.967%. In
other words, at 20 peaks per minutes it will take about 250
minutes to capture the highest luminance values of all 360
hues, with a 99.967% success probability.
C. Audio Inference Framework
With the above understanding of audio-visualizing light
properties, we can now design an inference framework for
inferring the source audio from its corresponding luminance-
profile. Due to the fundamental differences in the static and
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Fig. 7: (a) Audio Inference Framework; (b) Video Inference Framework.
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Fig. 8: (a) Cumulative probability distribution of a specific
hue appearing within first k peaks; (b) Cumulative probability
distribution of all 360 hues appearing within first k peaks.
random hue modes, we design separate processes for each of
them in the inference framework (Figure 7a), but both share
a common reference library.
Capturing Luminance-Profile. The inference attack starts
with the adversary recording the observed luminance-profile
(L′Au ) of an unknown target song (Au) using the lumi-
nance meter. The observed luminance-profile is the time-
series of observed luminance values, recorded at a constant
sampling rate (10 Hz). Therefore, the observed luminance-
profile can be represented as L′Au = {δt=1l , δt=2l , . . . , δt=ml },
where δt=ml is the observed luminance at time instance
m since start of the recording. In random hue mode,
the adversary additionally records the corresponding hues
δ
t={1,2,...,m}
h = 〈δtr : δtg : δtb〉 observed for all δt={1,2,...,m}l
in L′Au , for the purpose of normalization.
Luminance Normalization. Once the entire luminance-profile
(L′Au ) is recorded for a chosen observation duration, the next
step for the adversary is to normalize it in order to achieve
amplitude invariance during similarity search [14]. In static
hue mode, L′Au is normalized with respect to maximum δl
recorded at the point of observation. In random hue mode,
the adversary normalizes each observed δt={1,2,...,m}l in L
′
Au
with respect to the maximum δl recorded at the point of
observation for its corresponding hue. The output of this step
is a normalized luminance-profile, L′Au .
Creating a Reference Library. Before matching the normal-
ized luminance-profile (L′Au ) against a comprehensive refer-
ence library of songs, the adversary has to create a reference
library of luminance-profiles corresponding to songs in the
library of songs. As seen in Figure 3, the absolute audio
amplitude is directly correlated to the observed luminance.
Using this observation, we can create template luminance-
profiles by sampling the amplitudes in waveform audio files at
10 Hz, and converting them to absolute values. These template
luminance-profiles serve as an approximate representation of
how a audio-visualizing smart bulb will react.
Similarity Search. The final step for the adversary is to match
the luminance-profile to songs in reference library, as follows:
• Dynamic Time Warping. We use a classification method
based on Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) [27], an algorithm
for measuring similarity between temporal sequences that
are misaligned and vary in time or speed. We compute the
DTW distance between the observed luminance-profile and
template luminance-profiles in the reference library, select-
ing the song whose template yields the minimal distance,
i.e., we choose the song i such that:
Au = argmin
Ai
DTW (L′Au , LAi) (2)
• Optimal Subsequence Bijection. We also evaluate another
classification technique for measuring similarity between
temporal sequences, known as the Optimal Subsequence
Bijection (OSB) [23]. OSB is similar to DTW, but allows
skipping of elements in the query sequence with a penalty,
thus aligning noisy subsequences more efficiently. In our
evaluation (Section V) we present results obtained by using
OSB and compare them to those obtained using DTW.
V. AUDIO INFERENCE EVALUATION
We comprehensively evaluate our audio inference frame-
work (Section IV-C) across different experimental parameter
such as observation time duration, distance between adversary
and the smart bulb, visible transmittance of a window between
the smart bulb and adversary, and using different brands of
smart bulbs (LIFX A19 Color Gen3 and Phillips Hue Color
Gen3).
Experimental Setup We complied a reference library of
400 chart-topping songs, with equal composition of four
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Fig. 9: Experimental setup for evaluating audio and video
inference and data exfiltration attacks.
different genres: country, dance, jazz, and rock. We test two
different observation points, one in an indoor setting where
the observation point was at 5 meters away from the bulb,
another in an outdoor setting where the observation point
was at 50 meters away from the bulb (Figure 9). While the
outdoor setting represents a more realistic attack scenario
for the audio inference attack, the indoor observation point
can also be useful if the target user is listening using a
headphone/earphone (and if the adversary has indoor access).
For the indoor setting, a 20 mm 12x telephoto lens was used
to focus light on the sensors. For the outdoor setting, a 80
mm 45-225x telescope was used.
Observation Time and Accuracy First we evaluate the
success rate of our audio inference framework without any
obstruction between the smart bulb and observation point. The
window was kept open for the outdoor setting. The LIFX
bulb was used in this part of the evaluation, and audio-
visualization was performed using the manufacturer’s LIFX
Android application. For 100 test songs (25 in each of the
four genres), we analyzed observation durations varying from
15 to 120 seconds. The time at which the adversary starts
observing each test song’s audio-visualizing light output was
chosen at random. In static hue mode, the hue was chosen at
random before the playback of each test song. We measure
the accuracy of the framework based on the rank of predicted
songs matched against the entire reference library (rank of
1 being the correct prediction). From Table I, we can see
that the mean rank of predicted songs decreases with a larger
observation time window, which is intuitive. Inference accu-
racy in random hue mode was slightly worse than static hue,
but conforms to similar improvements for longer observation
time windows as static hue. Outdoor inference accuracy was
lower than the indoor setting, which is expected due to the
lower intensity of light reaching the sensors. Also, we did not
observe a significant advantage of using OSB over DTW. OSB
was slightly more accurate than DTW for shorter observation
durations, however, their accuracies were very similar for the
120 sec window sizes. This can be attributed to the fact
that, although OSB has the ability to skip outliers in the test
sequence, we have very few outliers in our test sequences to
begin with. This is because both audio-visualization and sensor
sampling follow approximately constant sampling rates.
Music Genres Certain genres are slower paced (such as jazz)
than others (such as dance). Some genres have high frequency
periodic beats (such as dance) while others are dominated
with flat vocals (such as country). These characters are also
reflected on the audio-visualizing smart lights, and results in a
higher confusion within the same genre. Figure 10 shows the
genre confusion matrix of 100 songs tested under the following
settings: 60 sec observation duration, indoor, static hue, OSB
(from results in Table I). We see that the highest confusion is
more likely to happen within the genre of the test song. In this
example, 51 songs were correctly predicted in the top rank,
while genres of 82 songs were correct in the same prediction.
This trend was observed across all different test scenarios. This
implies that even if the adversary is unable accurately match
the audio-visualized data to its corresponding song, he/she can
still infer the user’s media or genre preference.
Visible Transmittance of Window We next evaluate how
our audio inference framework performs when there is partial
obstruction, such as a tinted window, between the smart bulb
and the adversary. We used three window glasses of varying
Visible Transmittance (VT) – approximately 0.8, 0.65 and 0.4
– in the outdoor setting and evaluated the prediction accuracy.
We repeated the outdoor test with 100 songs using an 120 sec
observation time window size. In Table I, we see that the mean
ranks of the predicted song drops as the visible transmittance
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Fig. 10: Genre confusion matrix of 100 test songs.
TABLE I: Mean ranks of 100 test songs in different test settings and observation time window sizes.
LIFX Phillips Hue
No Obstruction 0.8 VT 0.65 VT 0.4 VT No Obstruction
15 sec 30 sec 45 sec 60 sec 90 sec 120 sec 120 sec 120 sec 120 sec 90 sec 120 sec
Indoor - Static Hue - DTW 5.47 5.35 4.24 1.90 1.18 1.01 – – – 1.23 1.09
Indoor - Static Hue - OSB 5.00 3.31 2.72 1.92 1.22 1.02 – – – 1.22 1.09
Indoor - Random Hue - DTW 6.21 4.58 3.37 2.81 1.72 1.03 – – – 1.68 1.16
Indoor - Random Hue - OSB 5.52 4.79 3.57 1.91 1.21 1.03 – – – 1.24 1.17
Outdoor - Static Hue - DTW 7.57 5.48 4.13 3.06 1.78 1.20 1.63 2.95 4.47 1.79 1.35
Outdoor - Static Hue - OSB 6.69 5.45 3.21 1.99 1.50 1.19 1.65 2.42 5.10 1.62 1.56
Outdoor - Random Hue - DTW 8.67 4.35 4.03 2.11 1.53 1.15 1.84 3.64 5.85 1.77 1.27
Outdoor - Random Hue - OSB 7.80 6.35 4.62 3.06 1.93 1.21 1.81 3.67 5.79 2.01 1.25
8of the window decreases. For example, the mean rank of
predicted song was 1.20 for inference using an open window
(test settings: outdoor, static hue, DTW), which declined to
1.63 using a 0.8 VT window, 2.95 using a 0.65 VT window,
and 4.47 using a 0.4 VT window. This is expected because
with lower VT of the window, the intensity of light reaching
the sensors is diminished. Thus, highly tinted windows can act
as an effective protection measure against such an inference
attack.
Generalizability We also evaluate the generalizability of our
results using other smart bulbs. We chose the Phillips Hue
bulb for this evaluation because of it’s popularity and it is
currently one of the few smart bulbs that support audio-
visualization. However, due to the lack of a native audio-
visualization feature in the Phillips Hue mobile application,
audio-visualization was done using hueDynamic, a third-party
application. Table I shows the mean ranks of 100 test songs
predicted after observing the audio-visualization of the Phillips
Hue bulb for 90 and 120 seconds. The mean ranks in most
settings, indoor or outdoor, were slightly higher than that of
using the LIFX bulb. On an average across all different test
settings, the mean rank of the predicted song increased by 0.06
and 0.13 for 90 sec and 120 sec observation time windows,
respectively. While these results validate the generalizability
of our inference attack, we investigated why the accuracy was
consistently lower than when using the LIFX bulb. One of
the primary contributing factors may be the difference in the
maximum light output between the two bulbs. The LIFX A19
Gen3 bulb is rated at a maximum of 1100 lm while the Phillips
Hue Gen3 is rated at a maximum of 800 lm. As a result, the
intensity of light reaching the sensors is lower, and aligning
with our previous observations, this reduces the accuracy of
our inference framework.
VI. VIDEO INFERENCE THREAT
When video-visualization is turned on in the mobile app,
the smart bulb reacts to the colors present in the input video
stream by changing its output light color to the average RGB
composition of the current frame in the video. Unlike audio-
visualization which is better understood with the HSB color
model, video-visualization is better represented using the RGB
model. This is because in audio-visualization the saturation
level never changes, whereas saturation (along with hue and
brightness) in video-visualization is entirely dependent on
the color composition of the current video frame. As all
three variables are dynamic, using the RGB model simplifies
the matching process with responses on a RGB sensor, as
described below.
A. Effect of Video on Bulb Color
To precisely study the video-visualization properties, we
created another exploratory setup (Appendix B). We played
a few sample video files multiple times and observed the
corresponding time-series of bulb’s RGB color measured using
the Vernier GDX-LC RGB sensor. The GDX-LC’s RGB sensor
captures responses in the 615 nm, 525 nm, and 465 nm peak
wavelength ranges, approximately representing the observed
Average 𝒇𝒓 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟖, 𝒇𝒈 = 𝟎. 𝟐𝟗, 𝒇𝒃 = 𝟎. 𝟏𝟒
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Fig. 11: (a) – A frame from the movie Smurfs: The Lost Village
(2017); (b) – Corresponding light output observed on a video-
visualizing LIFX bulb, 〈δr, δg, δb〉.
intensities of red, green and blue colored lights, respectively.
Our observations brought us to two similar conclusions as
in section IV-A. First, the observed RGB color of the bulb
〈δr, δg, δb〉 has some correlation with the average RGB color
in the current frame 〈fr, fg, fb〉 of the video stream (Figure
11), which is expected. As a result, the RGB “color-profile”
of a video (the time-series of 〈δr, δg, δb〉 when the video is
playing) observed on a video-visualizing bulb is unique to the
video, and the probability that a completely different video
also has the same color-profile is small (due to the high number
of colors possible per pixel, in each frame of both videos).
Second, similar to luminance-profiles in audio-visualization,
color-profiles also suffers minor distortions across multiple
recordings. If the color-profile of a video V1 captured during
two different playbacks is denoted by C ′V1 and C
′′
V1
, C ′V1 and
C ′′V1 will be similar but not identical. These minor distortions
can be attributed to varying network latencies, packet loss
due to network congestion and varying RGB calculation time.
However, similarity between C ′V1 and C
′′
V1
is generally good,
which can be utilized for designing dictionary-based elastic
time-series matching attacks.
B. Video Matching Using Color-Profile
We already detailed some characteristics of RGB smart
bulbs in random hue audio-visualization (Section IV-B). How-
ever, identifying hues based on observed response ratios
〈δr : δg : δb〉 is relatively simpler than accurately identifying
a 〈r, g, b〉 color from the observed responses. This is because
all three variables (hue, saturation and brightness) of the HSB
model are dynamic in video-visualization. Moreover, the non-
ideal characteristics of the light output, and/or RGB sensor,
makes it challenging to derive an accurate relation between
〈fr, fg, fb〉 and 〈δr, δg, δb〉. The two most significant problems
in inferring 〈fr, fg, fb〉 from 〈δr, δg, δb〉 are: (i) the primary
colors have different peak responses (Figure 5), and (ii) the
responses are non-linear with respect to brightness (Figure 6a).
We address both of the above problems by first normalizing all
observed δr, δg and δb with respect to the highest observable
δr, δg or δb. In case of both LIFX and Phillips Hue bulbs,
δb has the highest observable response at 100% brightness
(Figure 6a). This step also addresses other variable factors
such distance from the light source, and optical amplifications
before the sensor. After normalization, the δr, δg and δb
are interpolated based on non-linearities learned for each of
9the primary colors (Appendix A). The interpolated response
〈γr, γg, γb〉 is much closer to the true composition 〈fr, fg, fb〉
of the current frame (Figure 11). Even after normalization
and interpolation, 〈fr, fg, fb〉 and 〈γr, γg, γb〉 will not be an
exact match for most colors, because the observable color re-
sponses are not to ideal RGB proportions (Figure 5). However,
〈fr, fg, fb〉 and 〈γr, γg, γb〉 are similar enough that we can
create a reference library of color-profiles for a diverse set
of videos, and use it to match the observed color-profile of a
target video.
C. Video Inference Framework
With the above understanding of video-visualizing light
properties, we can now design an video inference framework.
Capturing Color-Profile. The inference attack starts with
the adversary recording the observed color-profile (C ′Vu )
of an unknown target video (Vu) using the color sensor.
The observed color-profile is the time-series of observed
RGB values, recorded at a constant sampling rate (1 Hz).
Therefore, the observed color-profile can be represented as
C ′Vu = {〈δr, δg, δb〉t=1, 〈δr, δg, δb〉t=2, . . . , 〈δr, δg, δb〉t=m},
where 〈δr, δg, δb〉t=m is the observed luminance at time in-
stance m since start of the recording.
Color Normalization and Interpolation. Once the entire
color-profile (C ′Vu ) is recorded for a chosen observation du-
ration, the adversary next normalizes and interpolates (as
described in Section VI-B) it to create the corresponding
normalized and interpolated color-profile (C ′Vu ).
Creating a Reference Library. The adversary next creates
a library of template color-profiles corresponding to video
files in a reference library. The template color-profiles can
be created by sampling the RGB composition in video files at
1 Hz. These template color-profiles serve as an approximate
representation of how a video-visualizing smart bulb will react
(Figure 11).
Similarity Search. The final step for the adversary is to
match the color-profile (C ′Vu ) against the template color-
profiles corresponding to the reference library of videos using
a time-series similarity computing technique such as Multi-
dimensional Dynamic Time Warping (MDTW) [38] . MDTW
is a generalization of DTW for measuring similarity between
temporal sequences, in two or more dimensions. We compute
the 3-DTW distance between the observed color-profile and
template color-profiles in the reference library, selecting the
video whose template yields the minimal distance. More
formally, we choose the video i such that:
Vu = argmin
Vi
MDTW (C ′Vu , CVi) (3)
VII. VIDEO INFERENCE EVALUATION
We comprehensively evaluate the performance of our video
inference framework (Section VI-C) for a variety of parame-
ters. However, as video-visualization shares some of the same
fundamental properties as audio-visualization, we expect to
see similar trends in inference accuracy for factors such as
window’s visible transmittance and use of different bulbs.
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Fig. 12: Mean ranks of 100 test videos in different settings.
Therefore, here we investigate other factors of interest such
as the size of the reference library.
Experimental Setup We complied a reference library of 500
full-length movies released on blu-ray in the last 10 years.
We test from the same two observation points as in the audio
inference evaluation, indoor and outdoor (Figure 9). Also, the
same telephoto lens and telescope were used in the indoor and
outdoor settings, respectively. A LIFX A19 bulb was used for
video visualization, and the GDX-LC RGB sensor was used
to record the bulb’s color output.
Observation Time, Distance and Accuracy Similar to audio
inference, we calculate the video inference accuracy based
on the mean rank of 100 test videos. For each of the 100
test videos, we analyzed observation durations varying from
60 to 360 seconds. The time at which the adversary starts
observing each test video’s video-visualizing light output was
chosen at random. In Figure 12 we see that the mean rank of
predicted test videos decreases with a larger observation time
window. For example, the mean rank was 6.34 for inference
using a 60 sec observation time window (outdoor observation),
which improved to 1.19 using a 360 sec window. Also, indoor
accuracy was more accurate with mean rank of 4.24 for a 60
sec window to 1.11 using a 360 sec window.
Size of the Reference Library Larger dictionary increases the
potential of a mismatch with another video having a segment
with similar color-profile as the observed segment. We validate
this using only half of the reference library for prediction (250
movies). In Figure 12 we see that the mean rank of predicted
test videos decreases with a smaller reference library. For
example, the mean rank was 6.34 for inference using 60 sec
observation window (outdoor observation) and the full library,
which improved to 5.53 using a 60 sec window and half the
library.
VIII. COVERT DATA EXFILTRATION THREAT
Next we present another smart light based attack framework,
using which an adversary can actively and covertly exfiltrate
private data from within a smart light user’s personal device or
network. This attack is possible on hub-less smart lights (e.g.,
LIFX) due to the lack of permission controls for controlling
the light within the local network. This attack may also be
possible using smart lights that connect via a hub, only if the
hub does not have permission controls. However, the Phillips
Hue ecosystem uses a hub with permission controls, and thus
cannot be used for this attack unless the malicious software
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Fig. 13: Smart light-based data exfiltration framework.
agent obtains access permissions by masquerading as an useful
application (a Trojan). However, Phillips Hue currently does
not offer any infrared-enabled smart lighting products, so we
use the LIFX ecosystem to design and evaluate the proposed
data exfiltration framework (Figure 13).
A. The Covert Channel
The adversary can potentially use either, or both, the visible
and infrared spectrum of a smart bulb to create an one-
way line-of-sight data exfiltration gateway, using transmission
techniques such as amplitude and/or wavelength1 shift keying
[39], [26]. However, uninitiated changes in the visible light
amplitude or color is more likely to get noticed, thus limiting
the effectiveness of such a malicious gateway/channel. As
human eyes are not sensitive to the infrared spectrum, it can be
used to create a covert channel which can remain undetected
for longer durations.
Depending on the amount of private data to be covertly
exfiltrated, channel bandwidth can be a deciding factor in the
success of such an attack. As a higher bandwidth channel
will take less time to transmit the data, compared to a
lower bandwidth channel, the likelihood of a detection and/or
disruption is lessened with higher bandwidth. In our empirical
tests we observed that LIFX+ bulbs can achieve a maximum
infrared output (power level 65535) from an off state (power
level 0) in approximately 0.45 seconds, and takes less than
0.2 seconds to completely turn off from a maximum output
state. As these are the maximum switching response times,
we can use the higher of the two as our clock period. After
adding some padding we round up the clock period to 0.5
seconds (ClockRate = 2 Hz), which results in the maximum
channel bandwidth of 32 bits per second if a multilevel (M -
ary) amplitude shift keying (ASK) [11] encoding technique
is employed with M = 65536. Channel bandwidth in a M -
ary ASK is (log2M)× ClockRate. However, distinguishing
between each of the 65536 power levels (amplitudes) may be
difficult, especially, if the distance of the receiver from the
smart bulb is large, primarily due to signal attenuation and
1As the LIFX+ series supports only 950 nm infrared light, only amplitude
shift keying is possible with the infrared spectrum.
channel noise. As a result, the error rate at the receiver is to
some extent proportional to M and the distance.
B. Private Data Encoding and Transmission
Once the value of M is decided by the adversary (based on
the distance and acceptable level of reconstruction quality), the
next step is to encode private data of interest (in binary form)
using M -ary ASK. This task is undertaken by a malicious
software agent installed on the target user’s device or network,
as outlined earlier in Section III. The encoded data is then
transmitted in blocks by controlling the infrared power level
of the smart bulb connected to the same device or network. For
example in 4-ary ASK, a ‘00’ data block will be transmitted
by setting the infrared power level of the bulb at 0 (off), a ‘01’
data block will set the power level at 21845 (65536÷(M−1)),
a ‘10’ data block will set the power level at 43690, and a
‘11’ data block will set the infrared power level at 65535
(maximum). Before data transmission, a pre-decided start
symbol [28] is used to activate the receiver, synchronize the
clock, and set maximum amplitude for normalization. After
data transmission is complete, an end symbol is used to signal
termination.
C. Adversarial Reconstruction of Private Data
On the adversary’s side, he/she observes the target user’s
smart bulb using an infrared sensor. As the LIFX+ bulbs
supports only 950 nm infrared light, the adversary requires
compatible infrared sensing hardware. We used a TSOP48 [8]
infrared sensor and recorded data using an ATtiny85-based
Arduino board. Once a start symbol is received by the infrared
sensor, the adversary starts recording the observed infrared
amplitudes representing the M-ary ASK encoded data, until
an end symbol is received. Then the adversary normalizes the
recorded data based on the maximum amplitude, and decodes
it to reconstruct the private data in binary format. Depending
on the amount of signal attenuation and channel noise, the
reconstructed data may not be identical to the original data.
IX. DATA EXFILTRATION EVALUATION
Next, we present performance evaluation results of our data
exfiltration framework outlined earlier.
Experimental Setup Standardized datasets - first 10 sets of
Harvard sentences [31] and a 128×128 image of Lena (Figure
15a) - were used to evaluate the Bit Error Rate (BER) in
the reconstructed data. The adversarial observation distance
from the smart bulb was increased in steps (5, 15, 30, and
50 meters), and BER was calculated for different values of M
(64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, and 2048) at each of these distances.
A LIFX+ A19 Gen3 bulb was used for transmission and a 80
mm 45-255x telescope was used to focus light on the infrared
sensor (TSOP48). A python script, acting as the malicious
software agent, was used to encode and transmit the test data.
It was executed on a Windows PC connected to the same Wi-
Fi network as the bulb.
Distance and Error Rate The infrared signal strength reduces
as distance from the bulb increases. As a result, the boundaries
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Fig. 15: Reconstructed image of Lena at different distances,
using 128-ary ASK.
between the M amplitude levels present in a M -ary ASK
signal is also diminished, leading to higher confusion between
neighboring amplitude levels and thus errors in the recon-
structed data. This phenomenon was evident in our evaluation
results (Figure 14), especially for higher values of M . For
example, with M = 2048 the BER increased from 0.138 to
0.496 when the distance was increased from 5 m to 50 m.
Note that when the signal is very week or corrupted, the BER
converges to 50%, provided that the binary data source used
approximately follows a fair Bernoulli distribution. In Figure
15 we see how the image of Lena is degraded with higher
BER for longer distances.
M and Error Rate The boundaries between the M amplitude
levels present in a M -ary ASK signal is also diminished when
the value of M is increased, leading to higher confusion be-
tween neighboring amplitude levels. In Figure 14, we observe
that the BER consistently increases for higher values of M .
However, even with high BER the reconstructed data can still
be useful for an adversary. For example, text inference from
reconstructed data is easier than many other encoding schemes,
because of the higher likelihood of confusion between neigh-
boring amplitude levels. Figure 16 shows the example of a
reconstructed Harvard sentence using 256-ary ASK. We see
that the incorrectly reconstructed letters are neighboring to
the original letters on the ASCII chart. For example, the
blank-space character (ASCII value 32) was confused with
‘!’ (ASCII value 33) and unit-separator (ASCII value 31).
An adversary can perform additional semantic analysis on the
reconstructed text to improve its correctness and legibility.
Original Text: A cup of sugar makes sweet fudge
Reconstructed Text: A buq pf!sugbr m`kes█suees hudfe
Fig. 16: Text reconstruction using 256-ary ASK at 15 m.
X. RELATED WORK
Private Information Leakage through Optical Side-
channels. Various forms of private information leakage threats
that employ an optical side-channel have been demonstrated
in the literature. For instance, Xu et al. [40] were able to
infer the video being watched using the changing light char-
acteristics observable through the target’s window. Similarly,
Schwittmann et al. [36] were able to infer a video played
on a TV, by exploiting a smartphone’s ambient light sensor.
An extended work by Schwittmann et al. [35] employed the
ambient light sensor on a smartwatch to accomplish the same
attack. Alternatively, Backes et al. [12], [13] demonstrated how
reflections from objects such as, users’ eyes, teapots and walls
can be exploited for spying on printed or digitally displayed
data.
The first inference threat that we demonstrated in this
paper employed an optical side-channel to infer the source
audio. While there are multiple previous research efforts
[37], [32], [15], [33], [41], [25], [20] on inferring audio
from different types of information side-channels, our use of
optical emanations from multimedia-visualizing smart lights
as an information side-channel for this task is unique and
novel. Our second inference threat employed an optical side-
channel to infer the video being watched by the target user
is similar to works by Xu et al. [40] and Schwittmann et al.
[36]. However, our video inference framework which targets
optical emanations from a multimedia-visualizing smart light
is significantly different from Xu et al.’s and Schwittmann et
al.’s inference frameworks that target light emanations from a
TV screen. As smart bulbs are much brighter than TV screens,
they make a desirable target for distant outdoor attackers.
However, the distinguishing features in a smart bulb’s output
is often limited to only one color (in the RGB space) at a time
as outlined in Section II. This makes it more challenging to
accurately infer the source video from a smart light’s output,
compared to a more straightforward analysis of the various
simultaneous features present in a TV screen’s output.
Information Exfiltration through Optical Covert-channels.
Loughry et al. [24] were one of the first to call attention
to information exfiltration attacks on air-gapped systems by
employing visible-light LED indicators to transmit bits of
information. Zhou et al. [42] demonstrated a similar attack,
but using a malicious infrared signaling hardware installed
on the air-gapped system. Guri et al. [19] leveraged on the
limitations of human visual perception in order to covertly
exfiltrate data through a standard computer LCD display, even
in the presence of a user. Guri et al. [18] extended their
previous work to exploit cameras equipped with infrared lights
to both exfiltrate and infiltrate data from/to an air-gapped
network. Shamir [34] demonstrated how a scanner can be used
to infiltrate data/malware in to an air-gapped network.
A common limitation of the above data exfiltration attacks
is that the covert-channel’s bandwidth is restricted due to
the binary nature of the signaling light, and slow switching
response time between individual bits. For example, Zhou et
al. [42] were able to achieve a raw throughput of 2.62 bits
per second, even after installing a custom infrared signaling
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hardware on the air-gapped system. Guri et al.’s [19] method
of encoding data in the form of QR-codes can potentially
achieve relatively higher throughput, but their reconstruction
was successful only from a short distance of up to 8 meters.
In contrast, infrared-enabled smart lights can act as a superior
data exfiltration gateway because - (a) they have fine-grained
control of brightness/intensity, which can be used to design
communication protocols that achieve higher throughput, (b)
they are brighter than LED indicators found on computers
and routers, increasing the possibility of data reconstruction
from a longer distance, and (c) the adversary does not have to
surreptitiously place any additional malicious hardware in the
target area (i.e., in addition to the smart light already installed
by the user).
XI. DISCUSSIONS
Limitations and Improvements: There are several factors that
can limit or improve the attacks presented in this paper. Factors
such ambient light (noise), reflections off a color painted wall,
no line-of-sight access to target user’s window, etc. can limit
the success of these attacks. On the other hand, an adversary
can improve the attacks by using high quality sensors (such as
high speed digital cameras) and optical lenses (such as wide
aperture telescopes). Our goal in this work was to demonstrate
the feasibility of these attacks using low-cost off-the-shelf
sensors and lenses (for example, the TSOP48 sensor costs less
than $10).
Countermeasures: Concerned smart light users can take sev-
eral measures against the proposed threats. We already saw
that windows with low visible transmittance causes the attacks
to perform poorly. Therefore, a simple mitigation would be
to cover the windows with opaque curtains and block light
leakage to the outside. For the inference attacks, the maximum
brightness of the bulbs can be reduced, so that the light
leakage is also reduced. To prevent the exfiltration attack,
strong network rules can be enforced such that computers and
smartphones cannot control smart bulbs over an IP network.
However, such rules may harm the utility of smart bulbs.
XII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we designed and evaluated two attack frame-
works to infer users’ audio and video playback by a system-
atic observation and analysis of the multimedia-visualization
functionality of modern smart lights. We also designed and
evaluated a covert and high bandwidth data exfiltration attack
by taking advantage of the infrared capabilities of these smart
lighting systems. We conducted a comprehensive evaluation
of these attacks in various real-life settings which confirmed
the feasibility of proposed privacy threats. These threats also
affirm the need for new protection mechanisms such as better
access control in light management applications.
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APPENDIX A - POLYNOMIAL INTERPOLATIONS FOR
NON-LINEAR COLOR RESPONSES
The observed RGB responses (δr, δg and δb) have non-
linear relationships with brightness (Figure 6a and Table II).
Therefore, we employ Lagrange polynomials to learn the
non-linearities. We use five observed 〈δr, δg, δb〉 points for
RGB〈1 : 1 : 1〉 in Table II to calculate Equation 5, using
Lagrange basis polynomials (Equation 4). The functions in
Equation 5 are then used in the attack phase (with different
distance and amplification factors) to accurately interpolate
all observed δr, δg and δb values in a color-profile. A similar
set of functions were also learned and applied for attacks on
the Phillips Hue bulb. γr, γg and γb remain approximately
constant across different amalgamations of primary colors, for
both LIFX and Phillips Hue.
γc∈{r,g,b} = F (δc) =
n∑
j=1
Pj(δc);
where Pj(δc) = cj
n∏
k=1;k 6=j
δc − δck
δcj − δck .
(4)
TABLE II: Normalized δr, δg and δb for different brightness
levels of RGB(1 : 1 : 1), using the LIFX bulb.
Composition 〈r, g, b〉 δr δg δb
〈0.2, 0.2, 0.2〉 0.04052 0.013536 0.058512
〈0.4, 0.4, 0.4〉 0.149747 0.050023 0.209917
〈0.6, 0.6, 0.6〉 0.355869 0.115935 0.485289
〈0.8, 0.8, 0.8〉 0.66887 0.218776 0.906446
〈1.0, 1.0, 1.0〉 0.741883 0.242022 1
γr = 9.8923δ
4
r − 8.6910δ3r − 0.2037δ2r + 2.0864δr
+0.1163;
γg = 979.13δ
4
g − 304.98δ3g + 7.1778δ2g + 5.8836δg
+0.1198;
γb = 3.5353δ
4
b − 4.6515δ3b + 0.6081δ2b + 1.3907δb
+0.1174.
(5)
APPENDIX B - EXPLORATORY SETUPS
Audio-visualization. In the exploratory setup we used a
Yoctopuce V3 (BH1751FVI) luminance sensor for measuring
light intensity (Figure 17a). A LIFX A19 Gen3 bulb was used
for audio-visualization. A 20 mm 12x telephoto lens was used
to focus light on the sensor.
Video-visualization. In the exploratory setup we used a
Vernier GDX-LC RGB sensor to measure RGB composition
of observed light (Figure 17b). A LIFX A19 Gen3 bulb was
used for video-visualization. A 20 mm 12x telephoto lens was
used to focus light on the sensor.
Infrared exfiltration. In the exploratory setup we used a
TSOP48 infrared sensor soldered on an ATtiny85 Arduino
board for measuring 950 nm infrared light (Figure 17c). A
LIFX A19+ Gen3 bulb was used as a M -ary ASK transmitter,
using the infrared spectrum. A 80 mm 45-225x telescope was
used to focus light on the sensor.
(a) (b)
(c)
Fig. 17: (a) Yoctopuce V3 (BH1751FVI) luminance sensor;
(b) Vernier GDX-LC RGB sensor; (c) TSOP48 infrared sensor
soldered on an ATtiny85 Arduino board.
